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Abstract 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the edited collection of the same name, which includes chapters 
that explore digital well-being from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, 
economics, health care, and education. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a short primer 
on the different disciplinary approaches to the study of well-being. To supplement this primer, we also 
invited key experts from several disciplines—philosophy, psychology, public policy, and health care—to 
share their thoughts on what they believe are the most important open questions and ethical issues for the 
multi-disciplinary study of digital well-being. We also introduce and discuss several themes that we believe 
will be fundamental to the ongoing study of digital well-being: digital gratitude, automated interventions, 
and sustainable co-well-being.  
Keywords: artificial intelligence; automated interventions; digital ethics; digital well-being; sustainable 
design. 
1. Introduction 
Recently, digital well-being has received increased attention from academics, technology companies, and 
journalists (see Burr, Taddeo, and Floridi 2020). While a significant amount of this interest has been focused 
on understanding the psychological and social impact of various digital technologies (e.g. Orben and 
Przybylski 2019), in other cases the interest has been much broader. For instance, the International Network 
for Government Science Advice (INGSA)—a forum that advises on how scientific evidence can inform 
policy at all levels of government—claims that “to understand wellbeing in the 21st century requires an 
understanding of transformative digital technologies as drivers of change not just in human material 
circumstances, but also in human values and organisational systems that support wellbeing” (Gluckman and 
Allen 2018, p.10). The digital transformation of society, it seems, requires a more thorough investigation of 
how our conceptual understanding of well-being may have been altered by emerging technologies and the 
new modes of being they enable. 
One may rightfully wonder why this surge in interest has happened now. After all, digital 
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technologies have been around for decades and our well-being has been dependent on technology for far 
longer (Floridi 2014). What, if anything, is different this time around? The short answer is that the function, 
use, effects, and even experience of digital technologies has been altered significantly by the widespread 
implementation of ubiquitous computing (e.g. wearables, smartphones), machine learning, and more 
recently artificial intelligence (AI). These technological developments have resulted in drastic changes to 
our environment, including social domains such as healthcare, education, employment, policy, and 
entertainment, and have also been accompanied by drastic shifts in media consumption and lifestyle habits 
(Ofcom 2018). Combined, these developments are exposing humans to an environment that is increasingly 
adaptable to them, either as individuals or as members of segmented groups, by monitoring and analysing 
digital traces of their interactions with intelligent software agents (Burr, Cristianini, and Ladyman 2018). 
This is an important shift. Whereas humanity has refined its ability to engineer and reconstruct its 
environmental niche over the course of our evolutionary history (Sterelny 2003), we are now at a stage 
where the design and construction of our environmental niche can be automated, thereby reducing the 
need for human agency and oversight. For example, recommender systems, due to their ability to operate 
at scale and speed, are deployed to control the architecture of our online environments, making split-second 
decisions about the design elements of web pages (e.g. colour of fonts), placement and content of links 
(e.g. advertisements), appropriate pricing for products (e.g. dynamic pricing of holiday packages), and much 
more (Milano, Taddeo, and Floridi 2020). Such a change is unprecedented and demands that we consider 
the ethical implications for our individual and social well-being. This is the primary purpose of this edited 
collection: to explore the ethics of digital well-being from a multi-disciplinary perspective, in order to ensure 
that the widest possible aperture is employed without losing focus on what matters most.  
The purpose of this introductory chapter, more specifically, is to provide an informative 
foundation to ground and contextualise the subsequent discussion, while also offering some initial 
suggestions about where to head next. That said, we do not consider it necessary to provide a precise 
definition or theory of ‘digital well-being’ that can serve as a universal placeholder for each of the 
subsequent chapters. This would be inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, as a multi-disciplinary 
(and often interdisciplinary) collection, each chapter will emphasise different aspects of digital well-being, 
conditional on the explanatory goal they wish to achieve. Second, it is unclear at present whether we need 
a new concept of ‘digital well-being’ that is distinct from ‘well-being’ in a meaningful way. And, finally, the 
purpose of this collection is to generate further interdisciplinary interest in the topic, in the hope that greater 
conceptual clarity may arise from subsequent discussions. Therefore, for present purposes, ‘digital well-
being’ can be treated as referring loosely to the project of studying the impact that digital technologies, such 
as social media, smartphones, and AI, have had on our well-being and our self-understanding of what it 
means to live a life that is good for us in an increasingly digital society.  
While the above outline may serve as a sufficient placeholder for general discussion, there is 
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obviously a risk of it leading to some conceptual confusion. For example, a philosopher could rightfully 
ask what explanatory or enumerative role the concept offers, over and above ‘well-being’ simpliciter. Does 
the restricted domain, entailed by the inclusion of ‘digital’, offer any useful theoretical constraints, or does 
it merely impede the philosophical pursuit of identifying the most general conditions for well-being? In 
addition, psychology and economics have, in recent years, developed new tools that are designed to measure 
the subjective well-being of individuals or the socioeconomic indicators that are treated as proxies of social 
well-being. What explanatory or prescriptive role would the concept of ‘digital well-being’ serve in these 
disciplines? Could it be employed as a theoretical construct to be measured by a range of psychometric 
tests? Could it offer any useful theoretical constraints to assist with the selection of relevant socioeconomic 
indicators of social well-being, and in turn help to guide policy decisions that seek to improve human 
capabilities in an increasingly digital society? These questions require careful consideration, ongoing 
scrutiny, and thoughtful discussion, and we hope that the current collection may offer a rich starting point 
for answering them.  
This collection includes chapters that explore digital well-being from a range of disciplinary 
perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, economics, health care, and education. Because of this 
broad focus, section 2 provides a short primer that serves as an introduction for those readers who may be 
approaching the topic of digital well-being from a particular disciplinary perspective. In each of these sub-
sections the reader will also find a short commentary from invited experts who were asked to provide their 
own views on how they think their respective disciplines may be affected by ongoing technological 
innovation (e.g. novel research methodologies, new means to test empirical hypotheses, impacts on policy-
making), as a way of pointing to further areas of research for the interested reader. Following this, section 
3 introduces several themes that we believe will be fundamental to the ongoing study of digital well-being: 
digital gratitude, automated interventions, and sustainable co-well-being. These topics are not intended to 
be exhaustive or representative of the literature (see Burr, Taddeo, and Floridi 2020 for a more detailed 
review). Rather, they have been chosen in part because of the connection they have to some key ideas in 
other chapters. What they offer is merely some initial ideas that are intended to be, in conjunction with the 
subsequent chapters, a platform and guide for further discussion. Therefore, we hope that this collection 
as a whole will provide an informative starting point for readers from different disciplines interested in the 
study of well-being, while also contributing to what we expect will be an exciting and interdisciplinary 
pursuit of ensuring humanity can flourish in this new digital environment. 
2. Theories of Well-Being: A Short Primer 
Theoretical statements about well-being are typically understood as making either a descriptive claim (e.g., 
whether the implementation of a socio-economic policy typically enhances or decreases some quantifiable 
measure of well-being), or a normative claim (e.g., an evaluation of the goodness or badness of some moral 
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action with regards to whether it maximises welfare). Although this can be a useful heuristic for assessing 
the nature of a particular well-being claim, it is also conceptually problematic. As Alexandrova (2017, p. xv) 
argues, empirical (descriptive) claims about well-being rely on an inseparable normative standard: “any 
standard or method of measurement of well-being is already a claim about the appropriateness of an action 
or state in the light of some assumed value.” For example, if a policymaker states that an economic policy 
(e.g., increasing funding for education) is highly correlated with some measure of social well-being, their 
descriptive claim is also mixed with a normative element (i.e., increasing funding for education ought to be 
done to increase social welfare). This is why the study of well-being is an inherently interdisciplinary task. 
Many disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, design engineering, economics, law, medicine, 
and sociology are concerned with well-being, and each discipline has its own distinct theoretical framework. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the commonalities and differences between the various theoretical 
perspectives because any digital technology that claims to be promoting or protecting well-being must at 
the very least implicitly presume some general account of what it is for a life to go well for an individual. 
By introducing some of the major theoretical perspectives, we will be able to specify more clearly what is 
at stake. Readers who are already familiar with the general issues in a particular discipline should feel free 
to skip over the relevant section. 
2.1. Philosophy  
Philosophy has a long tradition of seeking to understand the concept of ‘well-being’, including its 
relationship with other important ethical concepts, such as ‘reason’ or ‘goodness’. A standard view is that 
‘well-being’ refers to what is non-instrumentally good for a subject S (Crisp 2006; Woodard 2013). This notion is 
used to separate that which is intrinsically (i.e., non-instrumentally) good for a person—sometimes referred 
to as ‘prudential value’—from that which is merely good because of its instrumental role in leading to a 
greater level of well-being (e.g., income, employment, or social network). Therefore, a fully developed 
philosophical theory of well-being is concerned both with enumerating those things that are non-
instrumentally good for someone (e.g., a mental state such as pleasure, or desire-satisfaction) and also 
explaining why the individual ought to pursue and promote the respective good (Lin 2017; Crisp 2006; 
Tiberius 2015). These two theoretical objectives can come apart, such that there can be agreement between 
two theories regarding the enumerated goods for a particular theory (e.g., friendship) but disagreement 
concerning the reasons why these goods have prudential value (e.g., friendship satisfies an informed desire 
or fulfils an important part of our nature). Although it has been extended or challenged over the last couple 
of decades (Haybron 2008; Woodard 2013; Sumner 1996), a (simplified) typology for well-being theories, 
famously introduced by Derek Parfit (Parfit 1984), can help organise the various philosophical theories of 
well-being into hedonistic theories, desire-fulfilment theories, and objective list theories. This typology is 
sufficient for our present purposes. 
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Hedonistic theories claim that all that matters for well-being is the amount of pleasure and pain 
experienced by an individual, either at some point in time or over the course of their life. Different theories 
may diverge on how these states should be measured (i.e. their hedonic level) but will agree that more 
pleasure is good and more pain is bad. According to hedonists, if activities or objects such as music, love, 
food, or expressions of gratitude are good for us (the enumerative component), it is in virtue of their bringing 
about mental states such as pleasure and avoiding mental states such as pain (the explanatory component).  
Desire-fulfilment theories claim that it is good for us to get what we desire, and conversely, if our 
desires remain unfulfilled or frustrated this will lead to a decrease in our well-being. As with the other two 
theories, micro-debates exist within this class of theories that try to deal with a variety of possible objections. 
For example, desire-fulfilment theories are often objected to on the basis that the fulfilment of certain 
desires (e.g., the desire to stream one more television show rather than reading a book, or to eat processed 
meat rather than a healthier plant-based alternative) clearly leads to a diminished level of well-being. As 
such, desire-fulfilment theorists will seek to make the initial claim more precise and may argue that only 
those desires that are informed (i.e. held on the basis of rational deliberation and relevant evidence) should 
be considered.  
Whereas desire-fulfilment and hedonistic theories make reference to subjective attitudes that an 
individual possesses, objective list theories claim that well-being is constituted by some list of goods that are 
prudentially valuable irrespective of the attitude that an individual may hold towards them. Aside from this 
feature of attitude-independence, as Fletcher (2016) labels it, the list of non-instrumental goods may have little 
in common. They could simply be a diverse list including goods such as achievement, friendship, pleasure, 
knowledge, and virtue, among others.  
Each of the above classes of theories is home to a series of micro debates, e.g., whether the process 
of obtaining some good must be experienced by the subject to entail an improvement in their overall well-
being. These debates are a worthwhile theoretical enterprise but need not concern us for our present 
purposes. Moreover, in recent years, philosophers have focused on how it may be possible to integrate the 
various disciplines that study well-being in order to show how they can collectively contribute to an 
increased understanding of well-being (Alexandrova 2017; Bishop 2015; Haybron 2008). For example, 
Bishop states that we should begin with the assumption that “both philosophers and scientists are roughly 
right about well-being, and then figure out what it is they’re all roughly right about” (2015, p. 2). Psychology, 
as we will see in the next sub-section, is one of these sciences.  
Philosophy and Digital Well-Being 
Guy Fletcher (University of Edinburgh) 
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I understand ‘digital well-being’ to mean the impact of digital technologies upon well-being as opposed 
to some specific dimension of well-being (for an introduction to philosophy and well-being generally, 
see Fletcher 2016).  
There is a rich seam of work at the intersection of politics, philosophy, and journalism on the ways in 
which social media, big data, and the like function to undermine democratic institutions. I will leave this, 
very interesting, work to one side to focus on philosophical work that concerns the direct impact of 
digital technologies upon individual well-being. 
Philosophers are interested in the myriad ways that digital technologies can promote or undermine well-
being. One major focus of attention has been social media and the way in which social media impacts 
friendship, an important prudential good (whether instrumental or intrinsic). Social media creates new 
categories of purported friendship (‘Facebook friends’), makes it possible to make and sustain purely 
online relationships, and also has the capacity to affect our real-world friendships in ways that might be 
positive or negative for well-being (e.g. Elder 2014; Fröding and Peterson 2012; Jeske 2019; Sharp 2012; 
Vallor 2012). Philosophers are also interested in the way in which digital technologies such as social 
media impact upon the construction and expression of our personalities (e.g. Garde-Hansen 2009;  
Stokes 2012). 
Digital technologies are also philosophically significant in their ability to affect our powers, capacities 
and virtues. Recent philosophical work has examined the weakening of our powers of attention in a world 
of endless, readily-available, digital distraction, and the interaction between technology and the virtues 
(e.g. Williams 2018; Vallor 2016). One live question is whether it is possible to use or amend the 
technology itself to reduce its attention-grabbing nature. Another more squarely philosophical question 
is whether we can equip ourselves with powers and capacities to mitigate the attention-hogging effects 
of digital technologies, by developing specific virtues of attention and the like (e.g. Vallor 2016). 
Biography 
Dr Guy Fletcher is senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. His work examines the 
nature of moral discourse, philosophical theories of well-being, and theories of prudential discourse. He 
edited the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being (2016) and co-edited Having It Both Ways: Hybrid 
Theories in Meta-Normative Theory (Oxford University Press, 2014). He is author of An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Well-Being (Routledge, 2016) and has another book, Dear Prudence, forthcoming with Oxford 
University Press. 
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2.2. Psychology 
Well-being has become an important indicator of progress for many governments around the world, thanks 
in part to empirical research that has shown it to be associated with a range of positive outcomes such as 
“effective learning, productivity and creativity, good relationships, pro-social behaviour, and good health 
and life expectancy” (Huppert and So 2013). Unlike philosophy, the behavioural and cognitive sciences—
including psychology—are less concerned with whether these goods are non-instrumentally valuable, but 
rather with what causes them to fluctuate and how best to measure them.  
To understand the current theoretical focus of psychological theories of well-being, it is worth 
mentioning the emergence of positive psychology. Positive psychology emerged as a distinct disciplinary 
enterprise at the turn of the century. Writing in 2000, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi stated that, 
“[p]sychology has, since World War II, become a science largely about healing. It concentrates on repairing 
damage within a disease model of human functioning” (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p. 5, emphasis 
added). This disease model assumed that well-being arose from the removal of mental disorders such as 
depression, and thus required no separate study or distinct methodology of its own. Positive psychology 
rejected this model and instead sought to reorient psychological science towards a better understanding of 
valuable subjective experiences in their own right (e.g., happiness, contentment, or satisfaction). Its goal 
was to determine which environmental features are needed to achieve an optimal level of human flourishing for 
individuals and communities. 
To achieve this goal, it was necessary to establish a distinct set of theoretical tools which could be 
used to measure and validate various psychological constructs that constitute well-being. Perhaps the most 
famous of these scales is subjective well-being (SWB), which comprises three components: frequent positive 
affect, infrequent negative affect, and an evaluation of the subject’s ‘satisfaction with life’ (Diener et al. 
1985). The assessment of SWB typically relies on self-report (i.e. answers given by an individual in response 
to a question and on the basis of introspection), and because of this reliance the measurement of SWB can 
be affected by a range of cognitive or memory biases that impact an individual’s ability to accurately recall 
and report on the subjective experience being assessed (e.g. frequency of positive emotions). Methods such 
as experience sampling (Csikszentmihalyi 2008) have improved the reliability of SWB measures, by allowing 
researchers to deliver near real-time assessments of an individual’s experience through notifications that 
prompt users to reflect on their well-being at specific times of the day and during different activities, 
providing what is sometimes referred to as ‘ecologically-valid data’. More recently, suggestions to extend 
these methodologies by leveraging advances in ubiquitous computing have been proposed (Reeves et al. 
2019). 
SWB is widely assumed to be multidimensional, but there is disagreement over just how many 
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dimensions (or factors) to include. Huppert and So (2013), for example, argue that ten factors are needed: 
competence, emotional stability, engagement, meaning, optimism, positive emotion, positive relationships, 
resilience, self-esteem, and vitality. In contrast, Ryff (Ryff 1989) claims that only six factors are needed: 
autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relationships, purpose in life and self-
acceptance. In spite of these disagreements, there is often significant overlap between different theories, 
and many often rely on the same psychometric scales for measuring subjective well-being (e.g. Satisfaction 
With Life, Positive and Negative Affect Scale). We can separate the various psychological theories into two 
groups: hedonic and eudaimonic. 
Similar to philosophical hedonism, hedonic psychology claims that well-being consists of 
subjective experiences of pleasure or happiness, and can include “the preferences and pleasures of the mind 
as well as the body” (Ryan and Deci 2001, p. 144). Eudaimonic psychology, by contrast, claims that well-
being consists of achieving one’s potential, as determined by human nature. According to eudaimonic 
psychology, human flourishing occurs when “people’s life activities are most congruent or meshing with 
deeply held values and are holistically or fully engaged” (Ryan and Deci 2001, p. 146).  
These theoretical perspectives are often broadly characterised and can encompass a wide variety 
of different theories within their scope. For example, self-determination theory (SDT) is characterised as a 
eudaimonic theory (Ryan and Deci 2001). Briefly, SDT is a theory of human motivation and personality 
that is concerned with identifying the basic psychological needs of human individuals as well as the 
environmental conditions that are required to supply people with the nutriments to thrive and grow 
psychologically (Ryan and Deci 2017). SDT identifies three basic needs (competence, autonomy, and 
relatedness), which must be satisfied for an individual to experience an ongoing sense of psychological 
integrity and well-being. It is discussed further in chapter 2 of this collection (Supporting human autonomy 
in AI systems: A framework for ethical enquiry), in a contribution from Rafael A. Calvo, Dorian Peters, 
Karina Vold, and Richard M. Ryan. 
Psychology and the Study of Digital Technologies 
Amy Orben (University of Oxford) 
Psychologists are becoming increasingly involved in the study of novel technologies like social media. 
With the field’s focus being mainly on the individual, much of the work has examined digital technology’s 
effect on people’s well-being, cognition or behaviour (e.g. Burke and Kraut 2016). This research has 
routinely taken a broad view: examining the use of digital technologies as a whole, and trying to quantify 
how this affects the whole population or certain broad sections of society. Yet the diversity of digital 
technology uses and users might be the crucial aspect missing in current psychological investigations.  
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A lot of research has been done examining correlations or simple longitudinal relations between ‘screen 
time’ and general well-being outcomes, yet little concrete results have been found (Orben and Przybylski 
2019; Jensen et al. 2019). We now know that increased time spent on digital technologies is routinely 
correlated with decreased well-being, but it is unclear whether this tiny correlation is causal or influential 
(Orben, Dienlin, and Przybylski 2019; Ferguson 2009). These issues are compounded by the low 
transparency of work done in the area, especially in the light of the recent replication crisis and open 
science movements (Munafò et al. 2017).  
The next years will see more and more psychologists moving away from general ‘screen time’ to using 
more digital tracking and fine-grained digital usage data – if such data is provided by the companies that 
hold them (Ellis et al. 2019). They could then examine how specific uses of technologies might affect 
certain cognitions (e.g. self-comparison), which could in turn affect well-being (Verduyn et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, psychologists are increasingly integrating more robust and transparent research methods 
into their work, while also acknowledging that in-depth longitudinal studies will be needed to tease apart 
the cause-and-effect relationships that the public and policy are so interested in. Such work would 
ultimately allow researchers to come closer to understanding whether the increased use of digital 
technologies causally decreases population well-being by triangulating different types of evidence, diverse 
study designs and various measurement methodologies (Munafò and Davey Smith 2018; Orben 2019).  
Biography 
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2.3. Economics  
The development of new psychological measures of well-being has also brought about changes to the socio-
economic study of well-being. Welfare economics, for example, is typically concerned with the 
measurement of aggregate levels of well-being. Its aim is to construct a social welfare function, which can be 
used to rank order a collection of social states (e.g., the differential allocation of public resources), and in 
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turn help decide which of a possible set of social policies would maximise social well-being. This normative 
approach assumes a preference satisfaction view of well-being, in which rational agents are assumed to choose 
what is best for them and to reveal their preferences through overt choice behaviour (Binmore 2008). 
Obtaining this data at scale, however, is challenging and so surrogate indicators for national (or aggregate) 
well-being are often used instead.  
Until recently, one of the most popular indicators of national well-being was gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita. As Diener and Seligman (2004) note, this is because economic indicators of this 
type are “rigorous, widely available, and updated frequently, whereas few national measures of well-being 
exist.” In addition, increased GDP per capita is assumed to lead to an increase in the freedom of choice 
available to individuals, which from the perspective of the preference satisfaction view means a greater 
ability to maximise well-being (or utility).   
However, the use of such indicators as surrogates for national well-being has been widely criticised 
(e.g. Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2008), most notably from approaches within development economics, which 
often eschew the idea of a preference satisfaction view of well-being (Nussbaum 2011). One example is the 
capability approach (Robeyns 2005; Nussbaum and Sen 1993). In short, the capability approach draws 
attention to what people are “actually able to do and to be” in their environment, rather than simply 
assuming that their choice behaviour reveals a stable and ordered set preferences (Robeyns 2005)—an 
assumption that is also heavily challenged by research in behavioural economics that focuses on cognitive 
biases in judgement and decision-making (Kahneman 2011). A motivating idea here is that individuals need 
the freedom to pursue distinct capabilities, which may include health, education, arts and entertainment, 
political rights, social relationships, and so on. These diverse capabilities are poorly captured by a single 
indicator such as GDP per capita, and so a richer framework for measuring well-being is required.  
The influence of the capabilities approach can be seen in the United Nations Human Development 
Index and related programmes such as the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2019). It also 
influenced a report, commissioned by the then President of the French Republic, Nicholas Sarkozy, who 
stated that he was “unsatisfied with the present state of statistical information about the economy and the 
society” and that economic progress and social development required more relevant indicators than simply 
GDP (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2008). As one of their key recommendations, the commission suggested 
that “[m]easures of both objective and subjective well-being provide key information about people’s quality 
of life” and that “statistical offices should incorporate questions to capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic 
experiences and priorities in their own survey” (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2008, p. 12). Chapter 9 of this 
collection (Big Data and Wellbeing: An Economic Perspective), by Clement Bellet and Paul Frijters, offers 
a helpful overview of the recent developments that have followed this recommendation, leveraging insights 
derived from data-driven technologies, such as machine learning. 
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Public Policy, Well-being and Digital Technology 
Florian Ostmann (Alan Turing Institute) 
There are two prominent strands of inquiry at the intersection of well-being and digital technology that 
are of interest to public policy researchers and increasingly relevant to policymaking agendas. 
The first strand may be referred to as digitally derived insights about well-being – work that leverages 
technology-enabled methods and big data analytics to measure well-being and understand and manage 
its determinants. In the context of measuring economic welfare, this includes the use of novel analytical 
techniques and unconventional data sources (e.g. electronic payments, social media, or business news 
data) to predict GDP growth and related indicators in real-time (Anesti, Galvão, and Miranda-Agrippino 
2018; Galbraith and Tkacz 2018) or with greater accuracy compared to traditional approaches. It also 
includes the use of massive online choice experiments for welfare measurement – for instance, to 
estimate the economic value of zero-priced goods, which fails to be captured by measures of GDP 
(Brynjolfsson, Collis, and Eggers 2019).1 In the context of work that is dedicated to measuring subjective 
well-being, digital methods have impactful applications as well, illustrated by the use of digital surveys or 
novel inferential methods (e.g. sentiment analysis applied to social media activity or digitized books) to 
arrive at estimates of present or historical levels of subjective well-being (Hills et al. 2019). Finally, 
technology and data analytics can enable pathbreaking insights about specific factors that impact well-being 
– such as urban air quality, for example – improving our understanding of and ability to manage these 
factors (Hamelijnck et al. 2019; Warwick Machine Learning Group 2019).  
The second strand concerns the well-being effects of digital technologies (i.e., the positive or negative 
consequences that the adoption of relevant technologies may have for individual and societal well-being). 
Consequences of interest from a public policy perspective may be intrinsically related to the technology 
in question or be characterised by a more indirect relationship, spanning a wide range of different policy 
domains (OECD 2019). Correspondingly, understanding the well-being effects of digital technologies 
and developing policy strategies that support the realisation of benefits while managing negative effects 
constitutes a wide-ranging area of research. This area includes the potential of technological innovation 
to enable well-being-enhancing improvements in the design and delivery of goods and services, especially 
in essential areas where accessibility and quality improvements may be particularly impactful for 
disadvantaged members of society (e.g. health, education, financial services and the judicial system). It 
also comprises questions around digital exclusion, concerns about the risk of certain forms of innovation 
rendering consumers vulnerable to exploitative commercial practices, and a growing policy debate 
 
1 The most prominent zero-priced goods and services are often digital goods themselves, such as search engines or 
social media platforms.  
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around ‘online harms’ (e.g. disinformation, cyberbullying, encouragement of self-harm, online grooming, 
and access to age-inappropriate material) (Vidgen, Margetts, and Harris 2019; UK Government 2019). 
Finally, there are important questions around the relationship between digital innovation and more 
abstract welfare-related categories of analysis including economic growth, labour market dynamics, and 
competition and market power.  
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2.4. Health 
While conceptually distinct, health and well-being are also intimately related, and therefore some brief 
remarks are helpful. The World Health Organisation defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental 
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (World Health Organisation 2019), 
and Crisp (2017) notes that “[p]opular use of the term ‘well-being’ usually relates to health”.  
In the medical sciences, as Alexandrova (2017, p. 168) notes, “the stand-in for well-being is health-
related quality of life”. Quality of life (QOL), and related variants such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) 
or disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) (Hausman 2015), is used in similar ways to economic constructs 
(i.e. as an input to calculations that help to determine the efficiency of policy decisions and to allocate 
healthcare resources). As with psychology, the medical sciences also rely on a range of more specific 
measures of well-being, which can be tailored to individual diseases or patients and sometimes extend to 
the well-being of caregivers. Although these measures will often rely on clinical diagnosis and observable 
indicators, subjective evaluation and self-report is also seen within healthcare in the form of patient-
reported outcomes (e.g. Alexandrova 2017; Haybron and Tiberius 2015). We offer more detailed comments 
on the links between digital health technologies and digital well-being in section 3.2. 
Digital Health: The Future Role of Policy  
   
This version is a preprint. Please cite following version: Burr, C. & Floridi, L. (2020). The Ethics of Digital Well-Being: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. In C. Burr 
and L. Floridi (Eds.) Ethics of Digital Well-Being. Springer. 
 
 
Indra Joshi and Jessica Morley (NHSX)  
In July 2019 NHSX—a new joint unit bringing together staff from NHS England, the Department of 
Health, and NHS Improvement—came into being. It was created to ensure the NHS benefits from the 
best digital health thinking from government, the NHS, academia and industry.  
For too long, there has been a consistent lack of investment in digitising the health service, slow adoption 
of technology (it takes approximately 17 years for a new innovation to spread through the NHS (Leigh 
and Ashall-Payne 2019)), and fear stemming from past failures such a Care.Data (Sterckx et al. 2016) and 
the National Programme for IT (Justinia 2017). These setbacks have left NHS staff reliant on technology 
that was outdated in the 90s and forced patients to turn to digital services provided by unvetted third 
parties, in an attempt to manage or improve their health and well-being. This situation has introduced 
huge opportunity costs, economic costs (Ghafur et al. 2019), and risk into healthcare systems across the 
globe – not just the NHS (Mackey and Nayyar 2016). It is, therefore, clearly untenable.  
There is a need for a step change in the way that healthcare system providers approach digital health and 
well-being. Policymakers need to adopt a principled, proportionate approach to its governance (Morley 
and Joshi 2019)—one that is open to the significant opportunities for improving outcomes, cutting costs, 
and ultimately saving lives—but mindful of the clinical and ethical risks (Morley and Floridi 2019b). This 
requires introducing policies that ensure digital health technologies are: designed for specific users 
(Themistocleous and Morabito 2012); developed in the open (Goldacre, Morton, and DeVito 2019); 
interoperable; thoroughly and consistently evaluated (Ferretti, Ronchi, and Vayena 2019); evidence-based 
(Greaves et al. 2018); economically viable; clinically safe and efficacious (Challen et al. 2019); and pro-
ethically designed (Floridi 2016a).  
According to the World Health Organisation (2019), “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” Clearly harnessing digital 
technologies and the data that they generate in the right way, is going to be essential if healthcare systems, 
like the NHS, want to ensure their service users are able to achieve this state of wellbeing. Thus, while 
developing such policies will take time, we cannot afford to wait.  
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3. Digital Well-Being: Three Themes for Further Discussion 
In this section, we offer some thoughts on three themes that overlap with some of the subsequent chapters. 
These themes are inherently interdisciplinary in nature, and, therefore, are good examples of why the study 
of digital well-being requires a multidisciplinary approach. One thing they have in common is a strong 
emphasis on the importance of ethical design. As such, it is helpful to begin with a few clarificatory remarks. 
The following two statements are widely accepted in the ethics of technology: 1) technological 
design and engineering is a value-laden process, and 2) the use and implementation of technology has the 
potential to fundamentally alter the way we understand ourselves, each other, and our environment, which 
may in turn create new ethical challenges (Floridi 2010). A single example can help illustrate and justify 
both statements: the design and use of wearable heart-rate monitors, such as smartwatches and fitness 
trackers.  
 Starting with the first statement, a common technique that modern wearables employ for 
measuring heart-rate is known as photoplethysmography (PPG). PPG uses a light-emitting sensor to 
estimate changes in arterial volume caused by pulsating blood pressure. However, the design choice of 
which colour light to use (e.g. red, green, or blue) can have different consequences, some of which raise 
ethical concerns. For instance, green light has higher levels of accuracy than red light when the device is in 
constant motion—a common occurrence for wearables that are used for fitness activities. Therefore, if one is 
optimising for accuracy as determined by the context of use (i.e. fitness) this would seem like the obvious 
choice. However, green light has lower accuracy for darker skin tones than lighter skin tones, leading to a 
potential bias against certain groups of people (Woolley and Collins 2019). Therefore, the choice of which 
colour of light to use in PPG can be treated as a value-laden design choice, which may favour people with lighter 
skin and discriminate against people with darker skin.  
Turing to the second statement, a number of studies have explored how data collected from heart-
rate monitors can also be used to infer psychological information, including affective states (i.e., emotions) 
and psychopathological states (e.g., levels of anxiety) (see Burr and Cristianini 2019 for an overview). The 
process of recording and measuring biometric data and converting them into user-friendly types of 
information can be incredibly valuable for individuals who wish to track their health and well-being. In 
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some cases, the bio-feedback that these devices provide can even allow individuals to acquire a degree of 
volitional control over the heart-rate, which could help alleviate symptoms of anxiety (Abukonna et al. 
2013). However, as sociologists and philosophers have noted, the rapid increase in information to quantify 
and measure states of our bodies can also threaten our psychological integrity by negatively impacting our 
self-understanding and self-awareness (Lupton 2016; Floridi 2014). To illustrate, consider how the digital 
representation of our psychological states or process may be in competition with the internal 
representations that our brains have evolved to rely upon. Emotions, for example, are formed and refined 
on the basis of signals that originate from within our bodies. Smart devices aim to bypass this process—
known as ‘interoception’—by inferring our psychological states through a variety of techniques, some of 
which rely on probabilistic machine learning algorithms.2 In addition to ongoing questions regarding the 
accuracy and validity of these measurement procedures, there is a further concern about how this 
information is stored and presented to the user. For instance, unlike digital representations, our inner 
emotional states are not perpetually recorded in discrete forms in silico. Rather, our emotions are typically 
appraisals of our current context, and provide salient information about how to act in the current 
environment—they are action-guiding (Frijda, Kuipers, and Ter Schure 1989). In this sense, emotions have 
an immediacy and embeddedness that connects us to our present surroundings in ways that permanently 
stored digital representations do not. Digital representations, by contrast, are detachable records of past 
states or processes. While this allows them to store historical information for reflection, in doing so they 
lose the immediacy that our mental representations provide. It is possible that an increased use of digital 
technologies to represent our mental states or processes could alter the level of trust that we have in our 
own interoceptive capabilities, and may result in destabilising effects for our psychological integrity and 
well-being due to the altered functional role they play in guiding our behaviour and self-understanding. 
These brief examples of wearable heart-rate monitors helps to emphasise the importance of ethical 
principles in the design and development of digital technologies (for further discussion, see Floridi 2010; 
Calvo and Peters 2014). The following three themes, influenced by the subsequent chapters, share this 
emphasis on the importance of ethical design. 
3.1 Digital Gratitude  
The majority of readers will have an instinctive understanding of the concept ‘gratitude’, recognising it as 
either an emotion (e.g., feeling grateful towards an individual who has helped you), a behaviour (e.g., 
expressing gratitude to a friend or family member), or a virtuous trait (e.g., a praiseworthy disposition of an 
individual). However, the conjunction of ‘digital’ and ‘gratitude’ may not elicit the same instinctive 
understanding.  
 
2 See (Calvo et al. 2015) for an introduction to current techniques in affective computing. 
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Our use of the term ‘digital gratitude’ is intended to emphasise the mediating role that digital 
technologies have on the feeling, expression, or trait of gratitude. As is well understood, digital technologies 
are not neutral. Their design is often motivated by commercial interests, as Charlie Harry Smith highlights 
in chapter 3 of this collection (Corporatised Identities ≠ Digital Identities: Algorithmic Filtering on Social 
Media and the Commercialisation of Presentations of Self), and can also be used to manipulate user 
behaviour, as Michael Klenk discusses in chapter 4 (Digital Well-Being and Manipulation Online). This is 
important, because as Lavinia Marin and Sabine Roeser note in chapter 7 (Emotions and Digital Well-being: 
The rationalistic bias of social media design in online deliberations), digital technologies, such as social 
media platforms, “do not mediate the full range of human emotions and thus are an impediment for 
successful deliberations”, signifying a key risk of digital technologies. Similarly, we can ask what impact, 
both positive and negative, digital technologies may have on our conceptual understanding of ‘gratitude’, 
as well as the emotion itself.  
 Gratitude is an important affective trait. It is recognised by psychologists, anthropologists, and 
evolutionary biologists, as an other-directed emotion (e.g. gratitude towards a friend, object, or state of the 
world), one that plays a prosocial role in communities by strengthening interpersonal relationships and 
generating positive behavioural norms within organisations and groups (Yost-Dubrow and Dunham 2018; 
Ma, Tunney, and Ferguson 2017). Furthermore, gratitude is associated with higher levels of well-being—
more grateful people are happier, express higher levels of life satisfaction, and also demonstrate greater 
levels of resilience to negative impacts on psychological well-being such as stress and burnout (Layous et 
al. 2017; Wood et al. 2008). 
One reason that gratitude may have these benefits is because, as Allen (2018, p. 8, emphasis added) 
notes, “the experience of gratitude encourages us to appreciate what is good in our lives and compels us to pay 
this goodness forward.” Here, gratitude serves a dual role: it helps us identify and appreciate sources of 
prudential value (e.g. a mutually supportive online relationship with an anonymous stranger who helps an 
individual with difficult life challenges), and it encourages us to then increase the overall amount of 
prudential value by repeating the original behaviour and helping spread the feeling of gratitude to others. 
This latter role may also strengthen our original feelings of gratitude, generating a positive feedback loop.  
 Because of these benefits, digital technologies should (where relevant) be designed to promote 
feelings and expressions of gratitude, as well as additional motivating psychological attitudes (see chapter 2 
of this collection). For instance, designers could introduce additional points of friction into the process of 
interacting with information online (e.g., sharing and reading content on social media platforms). This could 
allow users to reflect on how they are reacting to information, rather than just instinctively “liking” a post 
with little to no thought about the benefits they received from the original content. While this may reduce 
the amount of valuable data available to the companies (e.g., implicit feedback from user behaviour that 
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updates recommender system algorithms), it could generate more meaningful engagement from users, 
further generating the perceived value of the social media platform (see Burke and Kraut 2016).  
Beyond social media, designing digital technologies to promote feelings and expressions of 
gratitude could have additional benefits. For instance, it could help direct our attention to the intrinsic value 
of our digital environment and possibly generate more virtuous civic attitudes, rather than simply self-
directed moral deliberation3. By encouraging users to appreciate what is good in our lives, users may be 
encouraged to recognise the shared source of prudential value that is contained within the informational 
infrastructure that surrounds us, what we have previously referred to as the infosphere (Floridi 2014). For 
instance, AI offers myriad opportunities to improve and augment the capabilities of individuals and society, 
ranging from improved efficacy in healthcare decisions (Morley and Floridi 2019c) to identifying novel 
markers of social welfare in big datasets (see chapter 9 of this collection). It is important that we a) continue 
to improve and augment our capabilities without reducing human control and b) continue to cultivate 
societal cohesion without eroding human self‐determination (Floridi et al. 2018). A greater consideration 
of digital gratitude in the design of digital technologies could help us strike these balances, by motivating 
us to identify sources of prudential value, both individual and social. 
However, as Andrew Gibson and Jill Willis demonstrate clearly in chapter 8 (Ethical Challenges 
and Guiding Principles in Facilitating Personal Digital Reflection), the process of designing even simple 
gratitude enhancing technologies, such as digital self-reflective writing journals, can pose many complex 
and interrelated ethical challenges. Furthermore, as noted by Matthew Dennis in chapter 6 (Cultivating 
Digital Well-being and the Rise of Self-Care Apps), the process of cultivating positive outcomes, such as 
well-being or gratitude, may sometimes generate a tension between the pursuit of the positive outcome on 
the one hand, and negative outcomes associated with too much screen time on the other hand. These topics 
are far from resolved, and we hope that this collection serves to motivate ongoing discussion and debate.  
3.2 Automating Interventions 
The final chapters in this collection discuss theoretical and conceptual issues related to the use of digital 
technologies for health care, starting with chapter 10 by Amelia Fiske, Peter Henningsen and Alena Buyx 
(The implications of embodied artificial intelligence in mental healthcare for digital wellbeing); followed by 
chapter 11 by Nick Byrd (Causal Network Accounts of Ill-being: Depression & Digital Well-being); and 
chapter 12 by Michael Thornton (Malware as the Causal Basis of Disease). Many ethical challenges are 
intertwined with these developments, some of which are discussed in the aforementioned chapters (e.g., 
ensuring adequate data protection when dealing with big datasets; developing novel provisions for harm 
 
3 See (Vallor 2016; Howard 2018; Floridi 2010, Chapter 1) for a range of comments and approaches to moral virtues 
in the context of sociotechnical systems. 
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prevention). However, the broad, collective scope of these chapters also helps to draw our attention to 
another significant challenge: how to establish when a legitimate basis for an automated intervention has 
been secured. Or, to put it another way, how can we establish whether and when there is a right to intervene 
on the basis of an automated decision? A few clarificatory remarks are in order.  
By now, it is well known that digital technologies, such as automated decision-making systems4, 
have enabled clinical researchers and practitioners to augment their assessment, diagnostic, and treatment 
capabilities by leveraging algorithmically-derived insights from large-scale datasets (e.g. The Topol Review 
Board 2019; Watson et al. 2019; Dwyer, Falkai, and Koutsouleris 2018; Morley et al. 2019). However, the 
use of these technologies outside of formal healthcare systems (e.g. in contexts such as education, 
employment, and financial services), and the corresponding ethical and public health challenges that arise 
from this deployment, is not as well appreciated (Burr et al. 2020). For instance, school administrators are 
using predictive analytics and social media data to identify vulnerable students who may need additional 
support (Watson and Christensen 2017), and financial services firms have used artificial intelligence to 
proactively detect consumers who may experience additional financial difficulties caused by their mental 
health issues (Evans 2019). While these developments may lead to more proactive and personalised support, 
the transition away from clinical settings also raises several ethical challenges (see Palm 2013), including the 
question of whether there is a legitimate basis for intervening. 
 To understand why this is important it is helpful to contrast the clinical use of automated decision-
making systems with non-clinical uses. In both cases, an automated decision can serve to establish a risk 
assessment or diagnosis of an individual and subsequently inform or select an intervention on the basis of 
these algorithmically-derived insights (e.g. nudging a user who experiences a dip in attention and 
engagement)5. This is problematic because, in clinical practice, interventions are typically decided upon 
following a process of participatory decision-making between the healthcare professional and their patient, due 
to the value-laden nature of health and well-being  (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Among other things, 
this process requires an assessment by the healthcare professional of the proportional risk associated with 
the intervention and the informed consent of the patient (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). It is currently 
unclear how automated decision-making systems should be incorporated into the process of participatory 
decision-making even within clinical settings (Morley and Floridi 2019b). Therefore, it is not possible to 
simply transpose existing bioethical guidance into the non-clinical settings, even as a starting point for 
 
4 To clarify, our use of the term ‘automated decision-making systems’ is intended to be inclusive of systems that are 
fully automated (i.e. not requiring human oversight) and also decision support tools that keep a human-in-the-loop. 
Furthermore, we treat the act of classification as a decision (e.g. the classification of disease on the basis of a radiology 
image). 
5 This example is based on the work of a research group at MIT’s Media Lab, who have developed a product 
(AttentivU) that seeks to improve attention through real-time monitoring of a user’s engagement, using a head-
mounted device that use physiological sensors (i.e. electroencephalography) to measure engagement (Kosmyna et al. 
2019). 
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further ethical analysis.  
 This is a vital and, in our opinion, unaddressed issue in the ongoing debate and discussion on 
informed consent in an age of big data and artificial intelligence. To clarify, informed consent in clinical 
decision-making is typically viewed as a morally transformative procedure that provides a normative 
justification for an act, such as a clinical intervention that carries an associated risk of harm (Kim 2019). 
The normative legitimacy of the informed consent process rests in part on the professional accountability 
established by formal healthcare systems and on the successful communication between healthcare 
professional and patient (Manson and O’Neill 2007), which in mental healthcare often requires ongoing 
explanation throughout treatment plans for chronic illnesses (e.g. depression). Accountability and 
explainability are, therefore, vital components of informed consent in mental healthcare but are currently 
poorly represented in digital health (Watson et al. 2019). 
Guidelines and frameworks are currently being developed to help ensure the accountable design, 
development, and use of digital health tools (Henson et al. 2019; Torous et al. 2019; Jessica Morley and 
Floridi 2019a). However, these developments will not easily transpose into non-clinical settings where 
comparable mechanisms of accountability and behavioural norms are lacking (Mittelstadt 2019). While 
there is, in principle, no a priori reason to doubt that such mechanisms could be established in non-clinical 
settings (e.g. education, criminal justice), the contextual nature of mental health diagnosis and treatment—
often emphasised by reference to the ‘biopsychosocial model’ (Burns 2014)—means that separate 
procedures will likely be required for each social domain where digital health tools are used to automate 
some part of a health intervention. 
Additionally, there are also conceptual issues to address if we hope to have a robust account of 
what constitutes an intervention in the first place. For instance, as Michael Thornton notes in Chapter 12, 
novel digital technologies pose a challenge to existing conceptual accounts of ‘health’ and the boundaries 
of the body, as many devices can extend or augment human capabilities, thus placing pressure on our 
existing theoretical concepts. It will be important, therefore, to develop robust accounts that are fit-for-
purpose. This extends to concepts such as ‘psychological integrity’, which needs to be critically analysed if 
we are to make sense of the ethical significance of interventions that are more informational in nature (e.g. 
personalised recommendations for diet or lifestyle choices, or algorithmically-derived nudges). 
Whereas the notion of bodily integrity is central to extant bioethical theories, comparatively less 
has been written about the normative status of interventions that impact an individual’s mental or 
psychological integrity6, despite being established in Article 8 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 
 
6 A notable exception seems to be the literature on neuroethics (e.g. deep brain stimulation or direct brain 
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3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is in part because of the close connection this usage has 
to existing theories of informed consent and personal autonomy and self-determination. However, these 
perspectives are insufficient when we reflect on the changing conceptual nature of concepts such as self-
determination, autonomy, and informed consent in an age where the boundaries and interactions between 
human users and artificial agents is increasingly blurred (Floridi 2014). It will, therefore, be vital to address 
these conceptual, ethical, and legal challenges if we are to develop satisfactory guidelines and frameworks 
that can govern the use of automated interventions on individual and social health and well-being.  
3.3 Sustainable Co-Well-Being 
Derek Parfit (1984) famously offered a series of thought experiment concerning so-called “harmless 
torturers”, designed to query our intuitions about the possibility of imperceptible harms and benefits. We 
can reconstruct these thought experiments as a way to pump our intuitions about how the design of 
sociotechnical systems challenge ethical concepts such as ‘responsibility’, and whether a greater reflection 
on principles like sustainability can help overcome these difficulties. 
First, and in line with Parfit’s original though experiment, imagine you enter a room and see an 
individual strapped to a chair, connected to various pads and wires that are designed to deliver an electric 
current to the victim. In front of you there is a dial with numbers ranging from 1-1000 that controls the 
electric current. You turn the dial by a single increment, increasing the electrical current so slightly that the 
victim is unable to perceive any difference in intensity. While certainly not a morally praiseworthy action, 
you are unlikely to be reprimanded for causing any harm to the individual concerned. However, we now 
run the thought experiment for a second time, and in this alternate scenario you turn the dial by one 
increment at the same time as 999 other people turn similarly connected dials by one increment each. The 
net result of this collective action is an intensely painful electric shock that ends up killing the restrained 
victim. Your individual action has not changed between these two scenarios, but the relation in which your 
action stands to the actions of the other 999 individuals has altered drastically: you have now contributed 
to the death of another human being.  
Next, consider the following scenario. You are waiting for a bus, tired from a long day at work. 
You are mindlessly scrolling through a list of possible videos that have been presented to you by a 
recommendation system that powers your video streaming app. You select a video of a fiery argument 
between two political pundits, in which one of them “destroys” their interlocutor. Ordinarily you would 
avoid selecting such a video, knowing that it is likely to be needlessly polarising and sensationalist. However, 
you’re tired and occasionally enjoy a spectacle as much as everyone else. Unfortunately, at a similar time, 
 
interventions). However, it is more common to frame these discussions in terms of standard bioethical principles 
such as autonomy or informed consent (Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu 2017; Craig 2016).  
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999 other individuals, with similar viewing histories to yourself also click on the same recommended video. 
The effect is that the recommendation system learns that users similar to yourself and the 999 other 
individuals are likely to click on videos of this nature towards the end of the day. As such, in the future it 
will be more likely to recommend similarly low-quality, politically polarising videos to other users. While 
not as harmful, or morally reprehensible, as the death of an individual, this example nevertheless 
demonstrates that certain technologies—whether electric chairs or recommendation systems—have the 
potential to alter the moral status of our actions when they stand in a particular relation to the 
complementary actions of other individuals. However, what’s the particular lesson for digital well-being 
that we should draw from this example? 
To begin, it is important to avoid the false charge that we are merely suggesting individual users 
must take greater responsibility for their actions online. The actions of the 1000 users impact subsequent 
recommendations in virtue of how the recommender system’s architecture is designed.7  Therefore, while 
the users do have a responsibility for their actions, it is a collective responsibility (similar in nature to Parfit’s 
harmless torturers) that emerges as a result of the interactions between the users and the system’s 
architecture. These interwoven interactions form complex sociotechnical systems, which connect human 
users and constrain their actions in important ways, leading to what we have elsewhere described as a form 
of ‘distributed moral responsibility’ (Floridi 2016b).  
While it is immensely challenging to foresee the consequences and emergent effects of complex 
sociotechnical systems like recommender systems, ethical principles can serve as deliberative prompts for 
thinking through the ethical challenges. As such, they can offer designers a dual-advantage of identifying 
key opportunities to increase social value, while anticipating and avoiding costly risks (Floridi et al. 2018). 
One such principle we wish to propose is the need to orientate the design of digital technologies towards 
sustainable and communal well-being (hereafter, ‘sustainable co-well-being’). While this principle needs 
explaining and unpacking, the focus on ‘well-being’ should be straightforward. As noted in section 2, well-
being is an intrinsic good at which much of human behaviour is directed. Therefore, although there is 
disagreement about what objects, activities, or states of the world bear prudential value, that well-being is 
a goal in itself and not merely as an instrumental means to other goods is relatively uncontroversial. To put 
it another way, well-being (or “the good life”), regardless of how it is understood at a subjective level, is an 
intrinsic good that system design should orientate towards8. The ‘communal’ and ‘sustainable’ aspects of 
 
7 Technically, this is known as ‘collaborative filtering’, which is a method for using the collaborative actions of users 
(e.g., which videos they watch, how long they watch them for, and what rating they give them) as ‘implicit feedback’ 
to train a recommender system (see Burr, Cristianini, and Ladyman 2018; Milano, Taddeo, and Floridi 2020 for further 
discussion). 
8 This point is clearly demonstrated by the widespread adoption of well-being in recent frameworks or guidelines for 
ethical technology design, including AI (see Floridi et al. 2018). 
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this principle requires a bit more explanation.  
As we learn more about the relationship between well-being and digital technologies, the role 
played by design is emerging as crucial, not just in terms of individual fulfilment, but also, and perhaps even 
more significantly, in terms of communal well-being, or co-well-being. Precisely because it may be difficult to 
reach final conclusions about absolute thresholds or values of digital well-being, strategies to rectify and 
improve solutions already adopted will need to be considered as necessary. For part of any form of well-
being consists in knowing that its erosion may not be irreversible. And the socialisation of well-being, 
increasingly stressed by its dependence also on digital technologies, will emphasise the socio-political 
aspects of co-well-being in ways probably unprecedented. In a world so connected, globalised, and mutually 
dependent, no discourse on digital well-being will be reasonable by focusing on individuals in isolation. 
Similar thoughts on these topics are explored by Loi in chapter 5 (What contribution can philosophy 
provide to studies of digital well-being?) where aspects of co-well-being are present in the different concepts 
of digital well-being that are explored towards the end of his contribution in this collection. 
Other frameworks and accounts have already emphasised the ethical significance of sustainability 
in design (see Floridi et al. 2018; Jobin, Ienca, and Vayena 2019). In addition, Calvo et al. in chapter 2 of 
this collection note the following, regarding sustainable or circular design, “Just as we need to design in 
ways that preserve the natural environment for our survival, digital technologies, like YouTube, need to be 
designed in ways that minimise negative impact on individuals and societies to preserve a ‘sustainable’ social 
environment.” The sustainability part of our principle is similarly intended as a deliberative prompt to direct 
attention to the ethical significance of various design choices, while keeping a clear goal in mind (i.e. the 
sustainable promotion of co-well-being). This complementary focus could help steer design choices and 
help strike a balance between mitigating key risks while maximising opportunities. For instance, the risks 
of unsustainable design could include lock-in to a system that, while valuable on the basis of some outcome 
measures (e.g. entertainment, revenue), may nevertheless propagate bias, entrench social inequities, or 
create tensions between users and designers over questions such as responsibility and accountability. By 
considering the need for sustainability at the outset, designers may be able to consider more agile or fluid 
solutions, which can adapt to shifting values that change over an individual life course and across societal 
shifts. It is worth remarking, in particular, that digital contexts enable forms of reversibility unknown in 
analogue contexts but that are often underused. Relying on our previous example regarding the political 
video, one may notice the unwelcome training of the recommender system due to an unfortunate 
synchronisation of choices and could intervene to adjust or even reverse such training. More concretely, 
one may imagine clicking on a YouTube video, dislike it, and “take back” the click both for oneself and for 
others, thus avoiding both the wrong training and the “winner take all” effect of more clicks attracting even 
more clicks. At the time of writing, this option is not available, but it is trivially feasible, technically speaking. 
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As stated at the outset of this section, these themes are intended as a starting point for further 
discussion. Nevertheless, we hope that they will provide an informative starting point for further 
engagement with the subsequent chapters in this collection. If we have been able to generate some positivity 
or excitement in just a small handful of researchers, we will be content (and grateful) that we have 
contributed to a small increase in overall well-being.  
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